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Abstract
Policing in Yugoslavia and in Serbia historically exhibits a
greater affinity towards the maintenance of a particular socio-polit-
ical order than it has the rule of law. This article argues against
common held international contentions that the police in Serbia is
resistant to reform. By reviewing the police force’s history, a ten-
dency towards constant reform reveals itself. Yet, despite the con-
stant change, policing is persistently politically dependent and in
rivalry with the military. This history of policing in the Balkans was
evidently not taken into account by international organizations
frustrated by the unwillingness of the Serb police to wholly adapt
the liberal formula on offer. The pace and direction of police reform
in this context appears closely tied to wider structural reforms of
the socio-political order. 
Key words: Yugoslavia, Serbia, Police reform, Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, socio-political transition. 
Introduction
Contrary to widespread perceptions of a recalcitrant and mono-
lithic institution, policing in Serbia has been in a constant state of
reform from its earliest beginnings in 1804. In fact, the institution
has proven so obedient to the vicissitudes of socio-political change
that it provides an accurate barometer of political history in Serbia.
Compelled to be more concerned with the maintenance of order
rather than the enforcement of law, uniformed policing has never
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been insulated from the socio-political and economic context in
which it has operated. While there is little evidence of a struggle to
gain autonomy, a brief look at its relationship to the various
authoritarian regimes that depended on the police helps us under-
stand why policing in Serbia developed along a different trajectory
from policing in other European states. It enables us to view more
clearly the reasons why the police decided not to continue defend-
ing the regime from the popular will on 5th October 2000.
Moreover, by tracing a political history of policing in Serbia we are
in a better position to map out the future prospects for the so-called
democratisation of the force. 
Policing Constitutional Monarchy
From the beginning of policing in its modern sense the police
in Serbia have exhibited both an affinity towards central author-
itarian rulers and a rivalry with the military. Both traits might be
traced to the earliest days of policing in the nineteenth century in
their role to protect the constitutional monarchy from demands
for parliamentary reform emanating from emergent political par-
ties. It is noteworthy that until 1875 all newspapers were forced
to present a proof-copy to the police an hour before publication.1
In fact so fragile was the Serbian kingdom that the nascent state
was arguably not only dependent on its security forces but was
subservient to it.2 Interestingly the earliest calls for police reform
emanated from the socialist Radical Party, which at the time,
according to Jelavich ‘was particularly interested in curbing the
influence of the police in elections, a prerequisite for their own
victory’.3
Reforms instituted by King Petar Karadjordjević however
took a different route after the regicide of Obrenović in 1903.
Karadjordjević augmented police numbers by elevating night
watchmen to the status of gendarmie, aligning them with a pow-
erful military nexus. Cox has pointed out that it is indicative of
the power wielded by this military police that no steps were taken
to arrest the conspirators to Obrenović’s murder.4 Subsisting
under the military umbrella might have afforded the gendarmerie
a great deal of power and prestige, but at the same time this lack
of autonomy hindered the development of policing in a manner
that is not evident in western European states. Even as late as
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1918, when the Ministry of Interior was first formed, policing in
Serbia was still under the command of the army. 
The formation of the Ministry of the Interior was part of a
series of reforms associated with the creation of the Royal
Yugoslavia and occurred during a liberalising period of
Karadjordjević’s rule. Perhaps the first sign of a break with the
military might be traced to February 1921, when the first police
training school was opened in Belgrade. Unfortunately for the
police this year also saw the death of King Petar and the throne
pass to the more authoritarian King Aleksander. It was
Aleksander who formally created a police force independent of
the military in 1929 but who also saw the potential role of the
police to secure order in his increasingly fractious kingdom fol-
lowing riots that occurred after the assassination of Stjepan Radić
in 1928. Aleksander viewed the police as pivotal to the mainte-
nance of his regime and allocated it a central role when he
declared his dictatorship in the same year. His first act was to
rewrite the Law on the Protection of the State. The sweeping
powers this legislation granted to the police were used fully and
viciously and, according to Horvat, the kingdom became a police
state where ‘legal authority was regularly pushed aside while in
its place came the secret police, the military police, the court
police, the police of influential individuals’.5 Atrocities that
occurred in Hercegovina and Macedonia by the Serb-dominated
force together with police repression being instituted in Croatia,
exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions in the kingdom and led to the
disintegration of the support for south Slav unity.6 Ironically
enough, while political policing led to the disintegration of the
first Yugoslavia, it would nevertheless become the foundation
upon which a communist dictatorship would resurrect the next
version of Yugoslavia. 
Policing Communism
It was tasked to Slobodan Penezić Krcun, as Minister of
Interior in Tito’s new Yugolsavia, to oversee the establishment of
the ‘peoples militia’ in 1946. Wearing bottle green jackets and
khaki trousers, the force was indistinguishable from the Partisan
army. It conformed to Tito’s desire for a reliable and obedient
force capable of maintaining communist order by immersing
itself amongst the populace. The construction of intelligence net-
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works was therefore a priority function of the force up until
1953, when Krcun was replaced by Vojin Lukić. Lukić headed the
police during a period of judicial reform following the intense
anti-cominformist campaign that, even according to Aleksander
Rankovič, the archly powerful Federal Secretary of Internal
Affairs, had compromised the judicial system ‘converting ordi-
nary crime into political criminal offences in a indiscriminate
manner’.7 Reforms included a change of uniform to the more
familiar blue associated with policing and the introduction of the
concept of ‘social self-protection’. Accordingly, ‘peoples councils’
(mesna zajednica) were established in every borough to imple-
ment social self-protection in 1953 that would become important
to police officers as a site of liaison with members of their com-
munities. 
Nonetheless, while social self-protection might have shown
some validity in Serbia, the predominance of Serb police officers
in other republics in Yugoslavia tended to undermine the concept.
In 1971 a Croat newspaper, Hrvatski tjednik was able to point
out that while Serbs comprised merely 15% of the city’s popula-
tion, Zagreb’s police force comprised 56.5% Serbs and 40.8%
Croats. 8
More reforms were implemented in the 1960’s when Milan
Miškovič, a Croat not under Rankovič’s influence, was appoint-
ed Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs. His appointment prefig-
ured Ranković’s purge in 1966 when the extent of police corrup-
tion and police involvement in smuggling came to light.
Ranković, a centraliser and a conservative, is generally blamed
for the disproportionate number of Serbs and the appointment of
a Croat might be understood to be an attempt to balance the eth-
nic scales. Misković’s brother was head of military intelligence so
his appointment ultimately enabled the military to gain more
influence over policing in Yugoslavia. Indicatively, in 1974
Colonel-General Frankoj Herjević, a Croat from the Yugoslav
army, was appointed Federal Minister of Internal Affairs; a posi-
tion he would hold until 1984. 
Operational reforms in the 1960’s saw the ‘people’s militia’
become the ‘militia’ in 1966 and a new system of non-military
ranking introduced in 1967. A new uniform was issued that was
uncannily close to that worn by the British ‘bobby’. These
changes however did not detract from the use of the police by the
government to repress dissent emanating from nationalists in
Croatia. In the early 1970’s Tito had begun to confront what he
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termed a dangerously liberal influence in Yugoslavia and has-
tened to ‘reunite, recentralise and rediscipline’ the party during
one of his more authoritarian periods of power. The use of armed
police power as an adhesive to be applied at will to remedy the
cracks spreading throughout an increasingly brittle Yugoslavia
could however only be a temporary measure. 
The death of Tito, economic decline and a resurgence of
nationalist politics marked the beginning of a new reform period
for the police in a tense and increasingly fractious Yugoslavia.
The deaths of several men in Titograd (now Podgorica) in
October 1988 saw the first time that the police had killed protest-
ing workers. In 1989 police were involved in clashes in Kosovo
where twenty-two protestors were killed. This prompted
Albanian members of the Ministry to resign en masse, only to be
replaced by hastily recruited Serb officers of questionable abili-
ties. Meanwhile in Serbia, the police was being vigorously
reformed to serve the objectives of Milošević’s ruling SPS. Rather
convincing evidence exists that during protests in Belgrade in
1991, the police were deployed in a manner that would force
them into conflict with protestors unhappy with Milošević’s poli-
cies.9 In response to the threat to his regime, Milošević
announced an increase in the size of the police and called up
reserve police forces.10 A new Minister of Interior, Zoran
Sokolović, was hired to oversee this period of reform. Under
Sokolović, the use of foot patrols was abandoned and the crime
prevention aspect of policing was de-prioritised. Social self-pro-
tection was made obsolete. Policing became a distinctly more
repressive affair as its budget simultaneously rose from the
unusually high 15.13% of GDP to 27.0%. 11 In 1991 a Law on
Internal Affairs facilitated the centralisation of the police and
local government was relieved of responsibilities it held over law
an order. A law on ranks was passed in 1995, which conferred
military ranks on eighteen administrative levels of the Ministry,
making it more administratively more prestigious than the army.
Furthermore, officers now routinely wore dark camouflage
fatigues and helmets, having received a much more martial edu-
cation in the Police Academy and at the Police College. It was
estimated by British intelligence that up to 5000 of these new
recruits were deployed to Kosovo by 1998, where emergency leg-
islation had conferred enormous power on the police to quell eth-
nic-Albanian disturbances. 
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Economic sanctions (compounded by the government’s
unwillingness to cut expenditure), a banking collapse in February
1993, and the highest rate of hyperinflation ever recorded had
ruined the economy and created a massive grey economy. Utterly
dependent on the loyalty of its security forces in this environment,
the government turned a blind eye as its police force moved into
this grey economy. In order to counter the legitimacy deficit being
experienced by these conditions seemingly contradictory but ulti-
mately superficial reforms were instituted in the mid 1990’s.
Efforts in 1995 to improve the image of by providing officers
with identification badges were augmented with policies to
improve the organisation’s relationship with the media. Under
Vlajko Stojiljković, appointed Minister of Interior in 1997, foot
patrols were re-introduced and patrol officers were instructed to
take more cognizance of non-crime safety issues.12 The effects of
these measures were minimal, as evidenced by a poll undertaken
at the time that found 33.7% of the population completely dis-
trusted the police.13 In short, Milosević had practically reversed
the development of the police back towards the sort of gen-
darmerie that operated in the late nineteenth century. The thin
blue line between the survival of his increasingly illegitimate
regime and the demands of the Serbian public became ever more
difficult to defend. 
Milošević’s attempts in July 2000 to push through constitu-
tional reforms that would grant him virtually dictatorial authori-
ty over the FRY government concentrated the opposition move-
ment. However, the ratification of Vojislav Kostunica’s disputed
victory in the August elections had only a minor impact on
Milosević’s rule when compared to the effects of the Kolubra
miners strike, which began on 29th September 2000.
Traditionally supportive of SPS rule, the miners strike proved to
commentators such as Crampton that ‘even the most favoured
sons of Serbian socialism had forsaken Milošević’.14 The strike
sparked a contagion of protest that the police did nothing to pre-
vent. Police barricades allowed strikers to march through to
Belgrade where a crowd of around 500,000 protestors had gath-
ered to call for Milošević’s resignation. The Head of Secret Police,
Rade Marković, later stated that police support for the regime
had been declining since the September elections and that ‘an
awareness that Milošević had lost entered the heads of the
police’.15 And while formally the police were given orders to ‘take
extreme measures’ against the protestors, an agreement between
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Zoran Djindjić, one of the protest’s leaders, and the charismatic
‘Legija’, Commander of the Ministry of Interior Special
Operations Unit, guaranteed that the police would not intervene.
It took until 5th October for the Kolubra strikers to reach
Belgrade and it is a telling indicator of the centrality of force to
Milošević’s government that it fell within a week of losing the
confidence of the security forces. 
Policing Democratic Transition
With a new socio-political order to maintain the Serb police
was to be once again subjected to reforms – this time however
change was being directed not only by the new government, but
also by the international community, under the guise of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Saturated
by corruption to the point of extreme ineffectiveness, overly mil-
itarized, dangerously powerful and entirely unused to upholding
the rule of law, it was generally understood that major structural
reform was in store that would tame the Ministry of Interior. In
March 2003 when Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić was assassinat-
ed the extent of the reform required became tragically visible.
According to the International Crisis Group 16 the fault lay in the
manner by which the parallel structures established by Milošević
were left intact by Djindjić’s government. The report identified a
nexus of state security, paramilitary organizations, politicians and
war criminals preventing reform of the Ministry. Despite the rhet-
oric of reform very little had altered in the years between October
2000 and March 2003. To be sure, the introduction of female
police officers, the blue European style uniforms with name tags
and use of clearly identifiable vehicles indicated some change had
occurred. However, structurally the institution was administered
virtually identical to the way it had always been. 
‘Operation Sabre’, which was launched in the wake of
Djindjić’s murder, authorised the Serb police to revert to its more
traditional repressive and militant model of policing. By some
accounts the operation was successful: 40,000 illegally held
weapons and two million ammunition shells were confiscated
while the power and influence of the infamous organised crime
gang of Zemun in Belgrade was eradicated. On the other hand
10,111 people were taken into custody and 3700 charges were
brought against 3200 individuals. This extraordinary number of
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arrests gives credence to any suggestion that not all the arrests
were related to the assassination. In fact only 45 people were
charged with directly attributable assassination related crimes.
Moreover, Amnesty International criticised the use of torture by
the police. 17 It would seem evident that the police used their
emergency powers to pursue matters not directly related to the
state of emergency. 
While the police routinely reverted to normal powers follow-
ing the emergency, a report issued by the OSCE in 2004 testifies
to the lack of structural reform in policing.18 Operation Sabre
bred a new confidence amongst police officers that had for years
been subject to criticism. Issued with a similar level of authority,
and with a corresponding licence to utilise their military training,
the police proved itself as adept at upholding the new socio-eco-
nomic order in Serbia as it had been upholding the old order. 
The other remarkable trait visible in Serb policing is its
predilection towards central authority and its suspicion of popu-
lar accountability structures. It would seem that although the
police is willing to support the democratic order, there is little evi-
dence to suggest that the government is anxious to make policing
itself a democratic institution. For instance, attempts to establish
an independent police inspectorate have foundered due to gov-
ernment interference. Additionally, an OSCE recommendation to
lustrate compromised police officers was interpreted to facilitate
a political re-shuffle of police management, allegedly to closer
align the institution with the political objectives of the Minister of
Interior, Dragan Jocić. 
Conclusion
Reform has been a constant feature of policing in Serbia.
Reform is of course tightly linked to the politicised nature of
policing in the region and to the tendency to denigrate the rule of
law in favour of the whims of a ruling party. In times of stability
order has been maintained by utilising the police to establish net-
works of informants and to blend uniform work with secret
police work. In times of instability order was imposed by a police
force trained, equipped and ready to use force. Whatever order
pertains – liberal or illiberal - it will be maintained. The police
force’s inaction on 5th October 2000 was an exceptional break
from its tradition of allegiance. There is little evidence however to
WBSO
W
E
ST
E
R
N
B
A
L
K
A
N
S
SE
C
U
R
IT
Y
O
B
SE
R
V
E
R
17 Amnesty International, Serbia
and Montenegro – Alleged Torture
during Operation Sabre. AI index
EUR 70/019/2003, September
2003.
18 M. Downes, Police Reform in
Serbia; towards the creation of a
modern and accountable police
service (Belgrade:Organization for
Security and Co-operation in
Europe Mission to Serbia and
Montenegro, 2004).
propose that the police was actively facilitating the transforma-
tion of Serbia into a liberal democracy. Nor is there evidence that
the police itself was enthusiastic about incorporating the trans-
parency and accountability structures associated with such a
policing in a democratic polity. Policing remains conservative,
politically obedient and thus vulnerable to corruption and manip-
ulation. It is not entirely clear that the reformers in the interna-
tional community readily appreciated the revolution required to
implement their suggested reforms. By insisting on decentraliza-
tion and an independent inspectorate, it not only threatened to
transform policing but also to drastically change the nature of
Serbia’s political culture. The lessons to be drawn for security sec-
tor reform in Serbia and elsewhere is that true change must be
constructed from within – foreign models tailored in different
contexts and imported without a due appreciation of the specific
political and historical context at hand will rarely succeed. Police
reform requires more than simply a reformation of the police. 
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